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OPINION OF THE COURT 
           
 
 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge: 
 These two appeals were combined for this opinion 
because the issue in both is whether the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands, when it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, may 
nonetheless transfer a cause to the Territorial Court of the 
Virgin Islands rather than dismiss it.  Because we conclude that 
a district court must dismiss the suit where there is no 
colorable basis for exercising subject matter jurisdiction, we 
will reverse and remand both cases with instructions to dismiss. 
I. 
 Helen Rawlins filed a complaint with the Virgin Islands 
Department of Labor, alleging that she was wrongfully discharged 
from her employment as a teacher with the Moravian School.  She 
alleged only claims based on territorial law.  The hearing 
officer ruled that Rawlins had been wrongfully discharged and 
ordered that Moravian reinstate her with back pay.  The Moravian 
School Advisory Board filed a writ of review in the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands.  Rawlins then filed a motion to 
dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.   
 Moravian, which did not respond to the motion to 
dismiss, did not then and does not now argue that there is 
federal jurisdiction over the suit.  Nevertheless, the district 
4 
court, rather than granting the motion to dismiss, transferred 
the case to the territorial court. 
 
 
II. 
 One day before the statute of limitations expired, 
appellee Jane Rogers, on behalf of herself and the estate and 
heirs of decedent Ingrid Corena Rogers, filed a medical 
malpractice action in the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
against St. Thomas Hospital, Elena Aguas, M.D., and the 
Government of the Virgin Islands, which owns, operates and staffs 
the hospital.  The suit arises from the allegedly negligent 
treatment given Ingrid Corena Rogers at the hospital, which 
treatment is alleged to have resulted in her death.   
 The complaint alleged only medical malpractice and 
related negligence claims.  The defendant-appellants responded 
with a motion to dismiss for, inter alia, lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  The district court stated in the hearing 
transcript that it would grant the motion to dismiss and transfer 
the action to the territorial court.  However, the court 
ultimately ordered transfer of the case without mentioning 
dismissal.  
III. 
 The U.S. Consititution, Article IV, Section 3 "empowers 
Congress to establish all necessary rules and regulations 
concerning the unincorporated territory of the Virgin Islands, 
including the power to designate the jurisdiction of the District 
5 
Court and the Territorial Court."  Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 
1027, 1032 (3d Cir. 1993).  Pursuant to this power, in 1954, 
Congress enacted the Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands, 
Act of July 22, 1954, ch. 558, §§ 22-23, 68 Stat. 497 (codified 
as amended at 48 U.S.C. § 1541 et seq.), which is "the Virgin 
Islands' equivalent of a constitution."  Brow, 994 F.2d at 1032. 
 Section 1612 of the 1954 Revised Organic Act set forth 
the jurisdiction of the District Court of the Virgin Islands, 
which included jurisdiction over federal questions, regardless of 
the amount in controversy, and general original jurisdiction over 
questions of local law, subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the local courts over civil actions where the amount in 
controversy was less than $500.  Act of July 22, 1954, ch. 558, 
§§ 22-23, 68 Stat. 506 (amended 1978, 1984); Brow, 994 F.2d at 
1032.  Section 1613 of the 1954 Act also provided that the local 
courts shared concurrent jurisdiction with the district court 
over all actions to the extent jurisdiction was conferred upon 
them by local law.  Act of July 22, 1954, ch. 558, § 23, 68 Stat. 
506 (amended 1984); Carty v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 679 F.2d 1051, 
1056 n.6 (3d Cir. 1982).    
 In 1984, Congress amended the Revised Organic Act to 
impose new limits on the general original jurisdiction of the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands over cases involving local 
law.  Brow, 994 F.2d at 1033.  Specifically, Congress amended  
§ 1612(b) of the Revised Organic Act to grant the district court, 
in addition to its federal question and diversity jurisdiction, 
general jurisdiction over "all causes in the Virgin Islands the 
6 
jurisdiction over which is not then vested by local law in the 
local courts of the Virgin Islands."  48 U.S.C. § 1612(b).  At 
the same time, Congress amended § 1611(b) of the 1954 Act, 
permitting the Virgin Islands legislature to 
vest in the courts of the Virgin Islands 
established by local law jurisdiction over 
all causes in the Virgin Islands over which 
any court established by the Constitution and 
the laws of the United States does not have 
exclusive jurisdiction.  Such jurisdiction 
shall be subject to the concurrent 
jurisdiction conferred on the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands by section 1612(a) 
[federal question and diversity jurisdiction] 
and (c) [criminal jurisdiction] of this 
title. 
  
48 U.S.C. § 1611(b). 
 Thus, as pertaining to purely local matters, the 1984 
amendment eliminated concurrent jurisdiction in the district 
court if jurisdiction became vested in the local courts of the 
Virgin Islands.  See Estate Thomas Mall, Inc. v. Territorial 
Court of the Virgin Islands, 923 F.2d 258, 260 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 808, 112 S. Ct. 50 (1991).  Later, under 
§1611(b), the Virgin Islands legislature amended 4 V.I. Code 
§76(a) to vest original jurisdiction over all civil actions in 
the territorial court as of October 1, 1991.  The amended section 
76(a) provides: 
Subject to the original jurisdiction 
conferred on the District Court by section 22 
[48 U.S.C. § 1612] of the Revised Organic Act 
of 1954, as amended, effective October 1, 
1991, the Territorial Court shall have 
original jurisdiction in all civil actions 
regardless of the amount in controversy.... 
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Accordingly, under § 1612(b), the district court was divested of 
jurisdiction over local civil actions as of October 1, 1991. 
Brow, 994 F.2d at 1034. 
 Although this divestiture is most directly applicable 
where a party files a complaint directly in the district court, 
as Rogers did, it also applies if a party files a writ of review 
in the district court, as Moravian did.  Section 1421 allows a 
party to appeal an administrative determination to the district 
court, which, under section 1423, has the power to "affirm, 
modify, reverse, or annul the decision or determination 
reviewed...."  However, because the amended section 76(a) divests 
the district court of jurisdiction over purely local matters, it 
also implicitly repealed section 1421 as it pertains to local 
matters.  Thus, whether Moravian had filed a writ of review or a 
complaint, would not change our analysis. 
IV. 
 The Virgin Islands legislature derives its power to 
legislate from the Revised Organic Act.  Brow, 994 F.2d at 1035 
n.6.  The Act extends legislative power "to all rightful subjects 
of legislation not inconsistent with this chapter or the laws of 
the United States made applicable to the Virgin Islands...."  48 
U.S.C. § 1574(a); see also 48 U.S.C. § 1574(c) (Virgin Islands 
legislature may not amend or repeal local laws so as to be 
inconsistent with Revised Organic Act or laws of the United 
States applicable to Virgin Islands). 
 The Revised Organic Act of 1954 permitted the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands to transfer any action or proceeding 
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brought in the district court to an inferior court established by 
local law (i.e. the territorial court), as long as the action was 
within the jurisdiction of the inferior court and the transfer 
was made in the interest of justice.  1 V.I. Code, Historical 
Documents, Revised Organic Act of 1954 § 23 ("Any action or 
proceeding brought in the district court which is within the 
jurisdiction of an inferior court may be transferred to such 
inferior court by the district court in the interest of 
justice.").  Section 32(b) of the Virgin Islands Code, title 4, 
was enacted pursuant to this section of the Revised Organic Act. 
See 4 V.I. Code Ann. § 32 note (Revision Note) (1967) (sections 
32(a) and (b) follow the language of §§ 22 and 23 of the Revised 
Organic Act of 1954).  That section provides: 
Any action or proceeding brought in the 
district court which is within the jurisdic-
tion of the territorial court may be 
transferred by the district court in the 
interest of justice to the territorial court 
for the proper judicial division. 
 
4 V.I. Code § 32(b).  Similarly, section 77(b) of the Virgin 
Islands Code states: 
A judge of the district court may, in the 
interest of justice, cause a case or cases 
pending in the territorial court to be 
transferred to the district court and may 
transfer cases pending in the district court 
to the territorial court provided that such 
transferred case is within the jurisdictional 
competence of [the] court to which the 
transfer is made. 
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4 V.I. Code § 77(b).  Although section 77(b) does not state its 
origins, presumably, it was also enacted pursuant to § 23 of the 
Revised Organic Act of 1954.    
 In the 1984 amendments to the Act, however, Congress 
deleted the language in § 23 permitting the district court to 
transfer actions to the inferior courts.  48 U.S.C. § 1613 (1984 
amendment).  Once that language was deleted, the Virgin Islands 
legislature lacked the authority to grant the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands the power to transfer actions to the 
territorial court.  Although Congress' intent in deleting the 
transfer language is not manifest in the 1984 amendment, we may 
infer that Congress deleted the transfer provision purposefully 
with the intent to do away with such transfers. 
 Our disposition of the transfer issue, however, need 
not turn on inferences alone.  As amended, § 1613 now provides 
for the relations between the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands and the territorial court to parallel the relations 
between the federal courts and the state courts.  48 U.S.C. 
§1613.  Congress, in turn, has defined the authority of the 
federal courts to transfer a case as follows: 
Whenever a civil action is filed in a court 
as defined in section 610 of this title or an 
appeal...and that court finds there is a want 
of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in 
the interest of justice, transfer such action 
or appeal to any other such court, in which 
the action or appeal could have been brought 
at the time it was filed or noticed.... 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1631 (emphasis added).  "Court" is defined in § 610 
as 
10 
the courts of appeals and district courts of 
the United States, the United States District 
Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the 
District Court of Guam, the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands, the United States Court 
of Federal Claims, and the Court of Interna-
tional Trade. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 610.   
 Because §§ 1631 and 610 clearly demonstrate that 
Congress intended to limit the authority of the federal courts to 
transfer cases only to other federal courts, we have held that  
§ 1631 provides no authority for a federal court to transfer a 
case over which it lacks jurisdiction to a state court. 
McLaughlin v. Arco Polymers, Inc., 721 F.2d 426, 429 (3d Ctiff 
sued in federal district court, alleging, along with state law 
claims, that the defendant had violated federal securities laws.  
683 F.2d at 745.  The district court granted summary judgment for 
the defendant, finding no cause of actiobanc), a district court's 
transfer of an action to a territorial court, where the district 
court has no colorable basis for exercising subject matter 
jurisdiction, is inconsistent with § 1631, made applicable to 
U.S. territories by § 1613, and thus is outside of the inherent 
authority of the district court.  
 Perhaps most significant to our disposition of these 
cases, however, is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), 
which states that, "[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the 
parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the 
subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action."  (Emphasis 
added).  In Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 
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254, 108 S. Ct. 2369, 2373 (1988), the Supreme Court held that a 
federal court could not invoke its supervisory power "to 
circumvent the harmless-error inquiry prescribed by Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 52(a)."  The Court explained that Rule 52 
is "as binding as any statute duly enacted by Congress and 
federal courts have no more discretion to disregard the Rule's 
mandate than they do to disregard constitutional or statutory 
provisions."  Id. at 255, 108 S. Ct. at 2373-74.  Rule 12 (h)(3) 
is equally as binding on us.  
 Neither Rogers nor Moravian disputes that the district 
court lacked jurisdiction over their lawsuits.  It is clear, 
therefore, that the district court not only lacked express or 
implied authority under federal law to transfer these cases to 
the territorial court, but was expressly compelled by Rule 
12(h)(3) to dismiss them.  It is equally clear that no such 
authority to transfer can be derived from the Virgin Islands 
Code, inasmuch as the laws of the Virgin Islands must be 
consistent with the laws of the United States.  48 U.S.C. 
§1574(a).  Accordingly, we conclude that the Virgin Islands 
transfer provisions are invalid to the extent they purport to 
allow a district court to transfer a case over which it lacks 
jurisdiction to the territorial court.   
 The appellees counter that our decision in Weaver v. 
Marine Bank, 683 F.2d 744 (3d Cir. 1982) allows the district 
court to transfer a case over which it lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction to a state or territorial court where a state or 
territorial statute authorizes the transfer.  The appellees' 
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reliance on Weaver is misplaced.  In Weaver, the plaintiff sued 
in federal district court, alleging, along with state law claims, 
that the defendant had violated federal securities laws.  683 
F.2d at 745.  The district court granted summary judgment for the 
defendant, finding no cause of action under those laws.  We 
reversed on appeal, and were in turn reversed by the Supreme 
Court, which held that the district court's decision to grant 
summary judgment was correct because the case did not involve a 
"security" within the scope of federal law.  Id.   
 On remand, we noted that Pennsylvania authorized 
transferring a case, improperly brought in federal court, to the 
proper Pennsylvania court.  Id. at 746.  Nevertheless, we made 
clear that the district court's power to transfer the case in 
Weaver was not circumscribed by lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction: 
We recognize that such a transfer by a 
district court is an exercise of a power 
granted not by federal, but state, law. 
Jurisdiction of a federal court is dependent 
upon federal statutory authority, but that 
principle does not control the issue here. 
Unquestionably, at the time the suit was 
filed in the district court, there was a 
colorable federal claim and pendent 
jurisdiction could properly be assumed.  The 
question presented then is, whether the 
district court, once having acquired 
jurisdiction, can transfer the matter to the 
state court by virtue of a state enabling 
statute.  We are persuaded that it can. 
 
Id. at 747 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  Finding "no 
equitable considerations which would bar transfer...," we 
remanded the matter to the district court with directions to 
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transfer the pendent state claims to the state court.  Id. at 
748.  
 These cases present far different situations.  Here, 
the respective appellees never even purported to present a 
colorable federal question or claim of diversity jurisdiction. 
Rather, they failed to recognize that the Virgin Islands 
legislature had divested the district court of jurisdiction over 
purely local claims, and erroneously filed suit in the district 
court alleging claims premised solely on local law.  From the 
outset, there never was a basis for federal jurisdiction. 
 We think the distinction is aptly noted in the 
dubitante opinion in Weaver, which noted the difference between a 
Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction and a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim.  Id. at 749.  "It is only if the former would have 
succeeded that the district court lacks power to entertain the 
pendent claim."  Id. (Sloviter, J., dubitante opinion) (citing 
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S. Ct. 773, 776 (1946) 
("Whether the complaint states cause of action on which relief 
could be granted is a question of law and just as issues of fact 
it must be decided after and not before the court has assumed 
jurisdiction over the controversy.")); see also 5A Charles A. 
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350, 
at 77 (Supp. 1995).   
 Our decisions since Weaver have emphasized this 
distinction.  In McLaughlin, supra, the plaintiff sued in 
district court, basing jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. 
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721 F.2d at 427.  The district court found that there was in fact 
no diversity of citizenship but, nevertheless, purporting to 
follow Weaver, transferred the case to Pennsylvania court 
pursuant to the same Pennsylvania transfer statute at issue in 
Weaver.  Id. at 428.    
 On appeal, we emphasized that Weaver dealt with a 
different situation -- one in which "we characterized the state 
law claim as pendent to plaintiffs' colorable federal claim that 
defendant had violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934...."  Id. at 429.  We noted that it was doubtful 
whether the plaintiff in McLaughlin had presented a colorable 
federal claim, and that "[t]here is a serious question whether 
the Weaver precedent can be extended to authorize the district 
court to transfer a state law claim in the absence of any 
colorable federal claim to which it could have been pendent." Id. 
at 430.  However, we did not reach that question in McLaughlin 
because, after the district court's transfer order, Pennsylvania 
amended its transfer statute to permit the preservation of claims 
filed in federal court, even without the transfer order.  Id.  
Nevertheless, McLaughlin makes clear that Weaver provided no 
authority for the district court to transfer this case, nor could 
it provide such authority, given the plain language of Rule 
12(h)(3). 
 More recently, we addressed an analogous situation in 
Bradgate Assocs. v. Fellows, Read & Assocs., Inc., 999 F.2d 745 
(3d Cir. 1993).  Bradgate Associates brought a diversity suit in 
district court and later removed a related state court case 
15 
between the same parties to the district court.  Id. at 747.  The 
two cases were consolidated, but the district court concluded 
that it lacked diversity jurisdiction and remanded the 
consolidated case to state court.  Id.  On appeal, we held that 
the district court erred by remanding to state court the portion 
of the case that was originally filed in federal court, and 
instead should have dismissed that part of the case.  We 
distinguished 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), which requires a district 
court to remand a case over which it lacks jurisdiction to the 
court from which it was removed: 
Lack of subject matter jurisdiction does not 
extinguish a removed state court case; 
section 1447(c) only requires the district 
court to remand it to state court.  In 
contrast, lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
terminates a case originally filed in federal 
court because Rule 12(h)(3) instructs the 
district court to dismiss cases which do not 
meet jurisdictional prerequisites.  See 
Weaver v. Marine Bank, 683 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 
1982) (Sloviter, J., dubitante opinion) ("I 
need cite no authority for the proposition 
that the power of the federal courts is 
defined by Article III and the acts of 
Congress made pursuant thereto.  No federal 
statute authorizes transfer of cases from a 
federal to a state court."). 
 
Id. at 751 (footnote omitted).  We noted that Weaver dealt with 
pendent state claims following a determination that federal 
question jurisdiction was lacking.  Id. at 751 n. 5.  While we 
also noted that, unlike in Weaver, there was no state transfer 
statute at issue in Bradgate Associates, the plain language of 
Rule 12(h)(3) makes clear that, where it appears at the outset 
that the district court is without subject matter jurisdiction, 
16 
it is powerless to do anything but dismiss the action.  Weaver is 
consistent with this rule in that the district court there had 
jurisdiction because the plaintiff had pleaded a colorable 
federal claim.  Weaver, 683 F.2d at 747; see also Bell, 327 U.S. 
at 682, 66 S. Ct. at 776.0  There is no such claim in the present 
case. 
V. 
 We conclude that the district court erred by 
transferring these cases to the territorial court.  The district 
court was compelled by Rule 12(h)(3) to dismiss both actions. 
Accordingly, we will vacate the transfer orders and remand with 
instructions to dismiss each cause0.   
 
The Moravian School Advisory Board of St. Thomas, V.I. v. 
Helen Rawlins; The Department of Labor, Government of The Virgin 
Islands Department of Labor, Government of The Virgin Islands, 
Appellant, No. 94-7359  
                                                           
0In Brow, we upheld the District Court of the Virgin Islands' 
order dismissing, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, an 
action to enforce an order of the territorial court.  In a 
footnote, we stated that the district court could have elected to 
transfer the case to the territorial court pursuant to the Virgin 
Islands transfer provisions at issue here.  994 F.2d at 1037 n. 
10.  However, because this statement was dictum, we are not bound 
by it, and decline to follow it inasmuch as it is in 
contradiction with Rule 12(h)(3).    
0Without prejudging the matter, we note that Rogers, in 
particular, may not be totally without remedy as she may have an 
action against her attorney for malpractice.  Her medical 
malpractice action was filed in the district court on April 5, 
1993, more than a year and a half after October 1, 1991, when the 
local legislature vested jurisdiction over such matters in the 
territorial court.   
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Jane Rogers, on behalf of herself; THE ESTATE OF INGRID CORENA 
ROGERS; NIRONE PAVON FRANCIS, minor; LAUREL SIMONE FRANCIS, minor 
v. GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS; ST. THOMAS HOSPITAL; ELENA 
AGUAS, M.D., No. 94-7421 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. 
 
 The majority believes the district court's transfer of 
Ms. Rogers' and Moravian's claims to the territorial court is 
inappropriate for three reasons.  I find its first two reasons 
(centering on the change in language of 4 V.I. Code § 23 and on 
an analysis of 28 U.S.C. § 1631 and 48 U.S.C. § 1613) 
unpersuasive.  I agree in principle with the third prong of the 
majority's analysis (centering on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(h)(3)) but believe that it counsels remand of Moravian's case 
for reevaluation of the jurisdictional issue.   While Rule 
12(h)(3) precludes transfer of Rogers' claim, this result so 
troubles me that I am prompted to recommend to the Virgin Islands 
Senate that it enact savings legislation that would, in the 
future, save claims such as those of Rogers and Moravian from 
extinction. 
 
I. 
 Under the Revised Organic Act of 1954, the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands was permitted to transfer any action 
brought in the district court to the territorial court.  4 V.I. 
Code, Historical Documents, Revised Organic Act of 1954 § 23.  In 
18 
1984, as part of a comprehensive restructuring of Virgin Islands 
jurisdiction, Congress amended § 23 by deleting the language that 
authorized such transfers.  See 48 U.S.C. § 1613, note (1984 
Amendment).  The majority infers that this deletion evinces 
congressional intent to prohibit such transfers.  I disagree. 
Deciphering congressional silence is always a tricky business. 
This is especially true when, as here, Congress authorizes a 
total restructuring with sweeping legislation.  In such 
circumstances, no reasonable inference can be drawn from 
Congress' deletion of any particular provision.   
 To further buttress its inferential argument that the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands may not lawfully transfer a 
case to the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands, the majority 
relies upon 28 U.S.C. § 1631 and 48 U.S.C. § 1613.  According to 
the majority, § 1613 "provides for the relations between the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands and the territorial court to 
parallel the relations between the federal courts and the state 
courts."0  The majority further explains that § 1631 "limits the 
authority of the federal courts to transfer cases only to other 
                                                           
0That section reads: 
 
The relations between the courts established by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States and the 
courts established by local law with respect to 
appeals, certiorari, removal of causes, the issuance of 
writs of habeas corpus, and other matters or 
proceedings shall be governed by the laws of the United 
States pertaining to the relations between the courts 
of the United States, including the Supreme Court of 
the United States, and the courts of the several States 
in such matters and proceedings.   
 
48 U.S.C. § 1613. 
19 
federal courts." (Emphasis added).0  Thus, federal courts may not 
transfer cases to state courts and, via § 1613, the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands may not transfer cases to the 
Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands.    
 In my view, the majority has mischaracterized § 1631. 
Section 1631 is an efficiency-oriented provision that governs 
transfers of cases between federal courts.  The problem with the 
majority's analysis is that, as I document in footnote 3, the 
federal transfer provision, § 1631, deals only with the relations 
of different federal courts to each other.0  See also McLaughlin 
                                                           
0The Section provides: 
 
 Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined 
 in section 610 of this title or an appeal . . . and 
 that court finds there is a want of jurisdiction, the 
 court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, 
 transfer such action or appeal to any other such court, 
 in which the action or appeal could have been brought 
 at the time it was filed or noticed.   
 
28 U.S.C. § 1631 (emphasis added).   
 
 "Court" is defined in § 610 as, "the courts of appeals 
and district courts of the United States, the United States 
District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District 
Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, the 
United States Court of Federal Claims, and the Court of 
International Trade."  28 U.S.C. § 610.   
0See S. Rep. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1981), which 
explains the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1631 as follows:   
 
 In recent years much confusion has been engendered 
by provisions of existing law that leave unclear which 
of two or more federal courts including courts at both 
the trial and appellate level--have subject matter 
jurisdiction over certain categories of civil actions. 
The problem has been particularly acute in the area of 
administrative law where misfilings and dual filings 
have become commonplace.  The uncertainty in some 
statutes regarding which court has review authority 
20 
v. Arco Polymers, Inc., 721 F.2d 426, 429 (3d Cir. 1983).  This 
has two implications.  First, § 1631's failure to authorize 
transfers to state courts cannot fairly be read to proscribe such 
transfers.  Second, § 1631 does not pertain to "relations 
between" federal and state courts and thus does not, via § 1613, 
affect the relations between the district and territorial courts 
of the Virgin Islands. 
 Thus, the only legal impediment to transferring cases 
to the territorial court is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(h)(3).  This rule states that, "[w]henever it appears by 
suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the 
action."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (Emphasis added).  Consistent 
with principles announced by this court in Weaver v. Marine Bank, 
683 F.2d 744 (3d Cir. 1982), and McLaughlin v. Arco Polymers, 
Inc., 721 F.2d 426 (3d Cir. 1983), the majority interprets Rule 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
creates an unnecessary risk that a litigant may find 
himself without a remedy because of a lawyer's error or 
a technicality of procedures.   
  At present, the litigant's main protective device, 
 absent an adequate transfer statute is the wasteful and 
 costly one of filing in two or more courts at the same 
 time.  This puts increased burdens on the courts as 
 well as on the parties.   
  Although most problems in this regard relate to 
 controversies involving the district courts and the 
 court of appeals, there also have been cases involving 
 the Court of International Trade, and the Temporary 
 Emergency Court of Appeals.  Therefore, the language of 
 Part A of Title III [§ 1631] is broadly drafted to 
 permit transfer between any two federal courts.  
 
Thus, this statute was written to cover federal transfers.  It 
has nothing to say on the issue of transfers between federal and 
state courts.  
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12(h)(3) to bar transfer of an action when the court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction.   I agree.   With this in mind, the 
majority correctly concludes that Ms. Rogers' case should be 
remanded with instructions to dismiss.     
 Contrary to the majority's suggestion, however, 
Moravian's case cannot be disposed of similarly.  In her 
complaint filed with the Virgin Islands Department of Labor, Ms. 
Rawlins may have alleged a colorable federal claim of age and 
national origin discrimination.  She averred, inter alia, that: 
 The employment practices at Memorial 
Moravian School, as well as its forms and 
conditions of employment have a disparate 
impact on persons who are of different 
national origin and are in the protected age 
group.  For example: 
[A].  The majority of the faculty members are 
not in the protected age group.  B.  Rev. 
Peters favors recruiting persons who are from 
the former British Colonies of the West 
Indies, as he is.  I am a native Virgin 
Islander.  C.  Persons who have been absent 
from work due to sickness or any other leave 
of absences did not have their employment 
affected as mine was.  D.  The person who 
replaced me (Mrs. Ham) is not in the 
protected age group, and is from one of the 
former British Colonies of the West Indies." 
(Complaint In Re Helen Rawlins, WD-005-90-STT 
- pages 1-3).     
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If Ms. Rawlins' originally alleged federal claims, such claims 
might provide an adequate basis for supplemental jurisdiction 
over her state law claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and thereby 
support Moravian's contention that the district court has the 
power to transfer.  I would remand to the district court for 
determination of what claims Ms. Rawlins asserted and whether 
they support supplemental jurisdiction.  If the court concludes 
that it has supplemental jurisdiction over Ms. Rawlins' state law 
claims, it should transfer them pursuant to 4 V.I. Code §§ 32(b), 
77(b).0  If not, it should dismiss them.    
II. 
                                                           
0Section 32(b) provides: 
 
 Any action or proceeding brought in the district court 
 which is within the jurisdiction of the territorial 
 court may be transferred by the district court in the 
 interest of justice to the territorial court for the 
 proper division. 
 
4 V.I. Code § 32(b). 
 
     Section 77(b) provides: 
 
 A judge of the district court may, in the interest of 
 justice, cause a case or cases pending in the 
 territorial court to be transferred to the district 
 court and may transfer cases pending in the district 
 court to the territorial court provided that such 
 transferred case is within the jurisdictional 
 competence of [the] court to which the transfer is 
 made. 
 
4 V.I. Code § 77(b). 
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 While I must agree with the majority's conclusion as to 
Ms. Rogers' claim, I am nonetheless troubled by it.  In 1984, 
Congress set in motion a restructuring of the entire Virgin 
Islands' judicial system.  This restructuring divested the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands of its purely local 
jurisdiction and transferred it to the Territorial Court of the 
Virgin Islands.  See generally Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 
1034 (3d Cir. 1993).  Congress must have known that significant 
confusion including cases being filed in the wrong court would 
result during this restructuring.0  Allowing numerous actions to 
lapse due to statutory confusion seems improvident, and this 
rings especially true in the Virgin Islands.  Deeply ingrained 
into the Virgin Islands legal culture is a policy of eschewing 
technical niceties in favor of hearing cases on the merits and 
effecting substantial justice.   
 In Ms. Rogers' case, the plaintiff's serious medical 
malpractice claim was filed in a timely manner, but the statute 
of limitations has now expired.  Given Rule 12(h)(3), this 
improperly filed claim cannot be transferred to the appropriate 
court.  The availability of a malpractice suit against a lawyer 
who may have various defenses or be uninsured and impecunious 
provides scant relief.  To avoid this unduly harsh result, I urge 
the Virgin Islands Legislature to enact a savings statute, like 
the one in Pennsylvania, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5103(b) 
                                                           
0For example, on February 3, 1993, Chief Judge Moore found it 
necessary to issue a memorandum of the entire Virgin Islands Bar 
on where writs of review should be filed. 
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(1995), which would allow preservation of claims filed in federal 
court without the necessity of a transfer order.  Such a statute 
would permit litigants to refile cases dismissed by a district 
court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in a state court 
simply by filing a certified transcript of the district court 
proceedings with the appropriate state authority.  To eliminate 
any time limitation problems, the savings statute would allow 
litigants to use the date the federal suit was instituted as the 
filing date for the state law claim.0  In this manner, a savings 
statute would facilitate the efficient dispensation of justice 
throughout the Virgin Islands. 
                                                           
0See McLaughlin v. Arco Polymers, Inc., 721 F.2d 426, 430-431 (3d 
Cir. 1983), for a further description of the Pennsylvania savings 
statute.  
